Incoherent and Coherent Eavesdropping in the 6-state Protocol of Quantum
  Cryptography by Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H. & Gisin, N.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
98
07
04
1v
2 
 2
0 
D
ec
 1
99
8
Incoherent and Coherent Eavesdropping in the 6-state Protocol of
Quantum Cryptography
H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and N. Gisin
Group of Applied Physics, University of Geneva, CH-1211, Geneva 4, Switzerland
October 19, 2018
Abstract
All incoherent as well as 2- and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies on the 6 state
protocol of quantum cryptography are classified. For a disturbance of 1/6, the optimal inco-
herent eavesdropping strategy reduces to the universal quantum cloning machine. Coherent
eavesdropping cannot increase Eve’s Shannon information, neither on the entire string of
bits, nor on the set of bits received undisturbed by Bob. However, coherent eavesdropping
can increase as well Eve’s Renyi information as her probability of guessing correctly all bits.
The case that Eve delays the measurement of her probe until after the public discussion on
error correction and privacy amplification is also considered. It is argued that by doing so,
Eve gains only a negligibly small additional information.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography, a protocol based on quantum physics for secret key agree-
ment between two distant parties [1], plays two central roles in the field of quantum
information processing [2]. First, it is the most advanced development in the field of
quantum information processing and it could be the very first application of quan-
tum mechanics at the individual quanta level. This is possible because quantum
cryptography can be implemented using only 1-qubit technologies, usually one pho-
ton, contrary to quantum repeaters [3], quantum teleportation [4] or, more generally,
quantum computers [2] that require the coherent processing of tens or even thousands
of qubits. Next, besides this quite practical role, the analysis of various eavesdrop-
ping strategies on quantum cryptography systems presents very instructive views on
the advantages that one can or cannot expect from coherent processing of several
qubits. Indeed, except the trivial intercept-resend strategy, eavesdropping requires
to let one or several auxiliary qubits interact coherently with the qubits send by
Alice to Bob. For example, the eavesdropping strategy on the the 4-state protocol
(known as the BB84 protocol [1]) optimal from Eve’s Shannon information point of
view has been found to be intimately related to the Bell inequality (an inequality
that clearly deals with a 2-qubit scenario) [5, 6]. Similarly, for the 6-state protocol
[7], optimal eavesdropping is related to optimal quantum cloning [8].
In this article we analyse general eavesdropping strategies on the 6-state protocol.
The symmetry of this protocol simplifies considerably the analysis (compared to
the 4-state protocol), in particular it reduces the number of parameters necessary
to describe general strategies. This motivates our choice to analyse this protocol,
although the experimental demonstrations all use either the 2-state or the 4-state
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protocol. In the next section, the 6-state protocol is described. Section 3 defines and
analyses general incoherent eavesdropping strategies, various optimization (Shannon
and Renyi information, probability of success on all or some qubits, etc) are presented
and the connection to the quantum cloning machine is made in section 3.1. Coherent
eavesdropping on pairs of qubits is fully analysed in section 4 and similarly for 3
qubits in section 5. The case Eve delays her measurement until after the error
correction and privacy amplification phase of the protocol is discussed in section 6.
Cumbersome computations and formulas are summarized in appendices.
2 The 6-state cryptographic protocol
The 6-state or 3 bases cryptographic scheme is nothing but the well-known BB84 4-
state scheme with an additional basis [7]. When represented on the Poincare´ sphere
the BB84 protocol makes use of the four spin-1/2 states corresponding to ±x and
±y directions. In brief summary; Alice sends one of the four states to Bob, who
measures the qubits he receives in either the x or the y-basis. A priori this gives a
probability 1/2 that Alice and Bob use the same basis. In other words on average
Alice and Bob have to discard half of the qubits even before they can start extracting
their cryptographic key.
In the 6 state protocol the two extra states correspond to ±z, i.e. the 6 states
are ±x, ±y and ±z on the Poincare´ sphere. In this case Alice sends a state chosen
freely among the 6 and Bob measures either in the x, y or z-basis. Here the a prior
probability that Alice and Bob use the same basis is reduced to 1/3, which means
that they have to discard 2/3 of the transmitted qubits before they can extract a
cryptographic key. However, this scheme does hold an advantage compared to the
BB84 protocol — higher symmetry. As it will be seen this fact together with the
use of symmetric eavesdropping strategies dramatically reduced the number of free
variables in the problem under investigation.
3 Single qubit attacks — incoherent eavesdropping
In the incoherent eavesdropping strategies Eve performs single qubit attacks, which
means that she investigates each qubit sent by Alice individually. One of Eve’s
major concerns is not to reveal herself in a too straightforward manner, for example
by introducing different error rates in the different bases, she therefore applies a
symmetric eavesdropping strategy which treats all Alice’s qubits on an equal footing
[9]. For each qubit Eve attaches a probe, initially in the state | 0 〉 and let the system
undergo the following unitary evolution:
| k 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √F | k 〉 ⊗ ψk0 +
√
D|−k 〉 ⊗ ψk1
|−k 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √F |−k 〉 ⊗ ψ0−k +
√
D| k 〉 ⊗ ψ−k1
(1)
where k = x, y, z, F is the fidelity, D = 1 − F is the disturbance and ψkj denotes
the state of Eve’s probe in the case where Alice sent the qubit in state k and Bob
received it disturbed (j = 1) or undisturbed (j = 0) (i.e. j indicates the number
of disturbed qubits). Recall that the disturbance is the probability that Bob gets a
wrong bit when he measures the qubit in the bases compatible with the state send
by Alice (sometimes disturbance is called QBER for Quantum Bit Error Rate). The
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ψkj are not arbitrary, but determined by the constrain that the transformation (1)
is unitary. Using the Schmidt decomposition [10] and unitarity of the interaction U
the ψ0 and ψ1-states can be chosen such that 〈ψ0i |ψ1j 〉 = 0 for all i, j = x, y, z. For
example, for the z-states the unitary evolution result in:
| z 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √F | z 〉 ⊗ ψz0 +
√
D|−z 〉 ⊗ ψz1
|−z 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √F |−z 〉 ⊗ ψ−z0 +
√
D| z 〉 ⊗ ψ−z1
(2)
The parametrization of ψz0 and ψ
z
1 can be conveniently and without loss of generality
chosen as
ψz0 = (1, 0, 0, 0) , ψ
−z
0 = (cos a, 0, sin a, 0)
ψz1 = (0, 1, 0, 0) , ψ
−z
1 = (0, cos b, 0, sin b)
(3)
Note that the 4 dimension of the Hilbert space of Eve’s probe is not an assumption,
but a consequence of the fact that only 4 states, ψ±z0 and ψ
±z
1 , appear in eq. (2).
The x-states may be expressed in terms of the z-states in the following way;
|x 〉 = 1√
2
(| z 〉+ |−z 〉) |−x 〉 = 1√
2
(−i| z 〉+ i|−z 〉)
| z 〉 = 1√
2
(|x 〉+ i|−x 〉) |−z 〉 = 1√
2
(|x 〉 − i|−x 〉) (4)
When substituting the states in (2) with the ones in (4), one finds, using the linearity
of U:
|x 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ 1√
2
(√
F | z 〉 ⊗ ψz0 +
√
D|−z 〉 ⊗ ψz1
+
√
F |−z 〉 ⊗ ψ−z0 +
√
D| z 〉 ⊗ ψ−z1
)
=
√
F |x 〉 ⊗ 1
2
((
ψz0 + ψ
−z
0
)
+
√
F√
D
(ψz1 + ψ
−z
1 )
)
+
√
D|−x 〉 ⊗ 1
2
(
i (ψz0 − ψ−z0 )− i
√
F√
D
(ψz1 + ψ
−z
1 )
)
(5)
where the ψx0 and ψ
x
1 are now expressed in terms of ψ
±z
0 and ψ
±z
1 :
ψx0 ≡ 12
(
(ψz0 + ψ
−z
0 ) +
√
F√
D
(ψz1 + ψ
−z
1 )
)
ψx1 ≡ i2
(
(ψz0 − ψ−z0 )−
√
F√
D
(ψz1 − ψ−z1 )
) (6)
In a similar way the states ψ−x0 and ψ
−x
1 can be found. When requiring that
〈ψx0 |ψx0 〉 = 1 one obtains the following expression for the fidelity
F =
1 + cos b
2− cos a+ cos b (7)
Going through exactly the same procedure for the y-states and again requiring that
〈ψy0 |ψy0 〉 = 1 one obtains in this case the following expression for the fidelity
F =
1− cos b
2− cos a− cos b (8)
Since the fidelity has to be the same in the two bases, the constrain cos b = 0 is
imposed, which means that the fidelity is given by,
F =
1
2− cos a (9)
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Notice that this implies that
ψz1 = (0, 1, 0, 0) , ψ
−z
1 = (0, 0, 0, 1) (10)
in other words, we now have that 〈ψz1 |ψ−z1 〉 = 0, which implies that Eve can gain
full information about the qubits received disturbed by Bob. Let us again emphasize
that the x−y symmetry assumption which guaranties (9) is not a restriction, since all
eavesdropping strategies are equivalent to a symmetric one [5, 6]. Notice furthermore
that incoherent eavesdropping strategies on the 6-state protocol can be parameterized
by a single real parameter a, in opposition to the 4-state case which requires 2 real
parameters.
Eve, of course, waits to hear which basis was used by Alice before she performs
her measurements. For symmetry reasons it is therefore enough to consider the case
where Alice sent a qubit in the z-basis; Eve first has to distinguish between the ψ0
and the ψ1 states. Since these states are orthogonal they can be separated perfectly
with a standard von Neumann measurement — as already mentioned this means
that Eve knows when Bob has received an error. Once she knows whether she has
a ψ0 or a ψ1-state, she has to distinguish between ψ
z
0 and ψ
−z
0 or between ψ
z
1 and
ψ−z1 . The overlap between ψ
z
0 and ψ
−z
0 is 〈ψz0 |ψ−z0 〉 = cos a, which means that Eve
can make the right identification with probability p(s) = 1
2
(1 + sin a) and make an
error with probability p(f) = 1
2
(1− sin a) [10]. Eve can distinguish the two ψ1-states
perfectly since they are orthogonal.
It is now possible to evaluate Eve’s probability of guessing the qubit correctly,
P (G), the probability of guessing the qubit correctly when Bob received it undis-
turbed P (G|undist.), Eve’ Shannon Information, IS, and her Renyi Information [11],
IR, in terms of the obtained fidelity and probabilities:
P (G) = F · p(s) +D (11)
P (G|undist.) = p(s) = 1
2
(1 + sin a) (12)
IS = F · SS(p(f)) +D · SS(1) (13)
where SS(p(f)) = 1+p(f)log2p(f)+p(s)log2p(s) is Eve’s Shannon information on the
ψ0-states and SS(1) = 1 is her Shannon information on the ψ1-states — remember
that she has full information on the ψ1-states. Finally,
IR = F · SR(p(f)) +D · SR(1) (14)
where SR(p(f)) = 1+log2(p
2(f)+p2(s)) is Eve’s Renyi Information on the ψ0-states
and SR(1) = 1 is her Renyi information on the ψ1-states.
To conclude this section let us make two remarks:
1. According to relation (9) the fidelity F can’t decrease below 1/3. This implies
that there is no way to spin-flip all the 6 states with a probability of success
larger than 2/3 (which corresponds to the measurement fidelity [12]).
2. Using the Peres-Horodecki separability criterion for 2-qubit states [13] one can
prove that Alice and Bob’s qubits remain entangled for D < 1/3. Hence, using
quantum purification and quantum privacy amplification [14] Alice and Bob can
establish a secure secrete key for all D < 1/3 (note that D = 1/3 corresponds
to the simple intercept-resend strategy).
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3.1 A special case: The Universal Quantum Cloning Machine
For increasing disturbance, Bob’s fidelity F decreases, while Eve’s probability P (G)
of guessing the bit correctly increases (i.e. Eve’s fidelity increases). Hence, they cross
at a specific value of the fidelity F=P(G). This happens for F = 5/6. For this value of
the fidelity the incoherent eavesdropping strategy turns out to be precisely identical
to the Universal Quantum Cloning Machine introduced by Buzˇek and Hillery [15]
and proven to be optimal in [16, 8, 17]. This is seen from the following:
UQCM | z 〉 =
√
2
3
| z, z, z 〉+
√
1
6
(| z,−z,−z 〉+ |−z, z,−z 〉)
UQCM |−z 〉 =
√
2
3
|−z,−z,−z 〉+
√
1
6
(|−z, z, z 〉+ | z,−z, z 〉)
(15)
Hence, the following identifications:
√
Fψz0 =
√
2
3
| z, z 〉+
√
1
6
|−z,−z 〉√
Dψz1 =
√
1
6
| z,−z 〉√
Fψ−z0 =
√
2
3
|−z,−z 〉+
√
1
6
| z, z 〉√
Dψ−z1 =
√
1
6
|−z, z 〉
(16)
lead to F = 5/6, D = 1/6 and that 〈ψz0 |ψ−z0 〉 = cos a = 4/5 and 〈ψz1 |ψ−z1 〉 = 0.
The states on the right hand side of eq. (15) belong to the 3 qubit Hilbert space.
The first qubit is the original one, the second one is the copy and the third one the
internal (2-dimensional) state of the cloning machine. In quantum cloning the picture
is that the original and the clone correspond to the output. In this case the internal
state of the cloning machine provides no information at all neither on the original
state nor on the success of the cloning process [8]. In the case of eavesdropping,
on the opposite, the original qubit is viewed as the output of the eavesdropping
machine, while Eve keeps the clone and the machine. Next, she waits to know the
basis used by Alice. Using then a coherent measurement on both the clone and the
copy-machine, Eve can determine whether or not the original qubit going to Bob is
disturbed (the measurement has to be coherent because the subspaces spanned by
the ψ±z0 and by the ψ
±z
1 are entangled). Moreover, in case Bob’s qubit is disturbed,
Eve can gain full information on the original qubit, contrary to the quantum cloning
situation.
This connection between incoherent eavesdropping on the 6-state protocol and the
universal quantum cloning machine replaces the connection that was found between
incoherent eavesdropping on the 4-state protocol and the Bell-CHSH inequality [18,
19, 5, 6]. This could be expected [20], since the Bell-CHSH inequality involves 4 states
that lie in a plane on the Poincare´ sphere similarly to the 4-state protocol, while the
universal quantum cloning machine treats all states symmetrically, similarly to the
6-state protocol. The main difference between the two connections is that for the
4-state protocol it happens when Eve and Bob Shannon information are equal, while
for the 6-state protocol it happens when Eve and Bob fidelities (ie mean probability
of correct guess) coincide. This can be traced back to the fact that the Bell inequality
is a characteristic of mutual information between two random variables [21] while the
universal quantum cloning is, by definition, optimized from the fidelity point of view.
This suggest to look at the eavesdropping strategy for the 6-state protocol when Eve
and Bob information coincide, but we could not find any interesting connection there.
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4 2-qubit Coherent eavesdropping
In the case of 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping Eve attaches one probe to two of the
qubits sent by Alice. In order to avoid easy detection Eve makes her eavesdropping
on qubits which are not necessarily sent successively. Again, after attaching her
probe to the qubits, she let the system undergo a unitary transformation, which in
this case looks as follows (k, k′ = x, y, z):
| k, k′ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √α | kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψkk′0 +
√
β | k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψkk′12
+
√
β |−kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψkk′11 +
√
γ |−k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψkk′2
| k,−k′ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √β | kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψk−k′12 +
√
α | k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψk−k′0
+
√
γ |−kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψk−k′2 +
√
β |−k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψk−k′11
|−k, k′ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √β | kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−kk′11 +
√
γ | k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−kk′2
+
√
α |−kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−kk′0 +
√
β |−k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−kk′12
|−k,−k′ 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √γ | kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−k−k′2 +
√
β | k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−k−k′11
+
√
β |−kk′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−k−k′12 +
√
α |−k−k′ 〉 ⊗ ψ−k−k′0
(17)
In these notations, the ψi,j0 denote Eve’s probe state in the case Bob receives both
qubits undisturbed. The ψi.j11 , ψ
i.j
12 and ψ
i.j
2 correspond to the case that the first, sec-
ond and both qubits are disturbed, respectively. The fidelity F and the disturbance
D, as determined by Alice and Bob, are given by
F = α+ β , D = β + γ (18)
and satisfy
F +D = α+ 2β + γ = 1. (19)
As for the incoherent case, we write the states (17) in the Schmidt decomposition [10],
hence all sets {ψi,j0 , ψi,j11 , ψi,j12 , ψi,j2 }, i, j = ±x,±y,±z are formed of four mutually
orthogonal normalized states. Since we are considering (without loss of generality
[6]) symmetric eavesdropping strategies this imposes some restrictions on the scalar
products which characterize the unitary operation U used in Eve’s attack. Here this
means that the scalar products have to be invariant under the exchange of + and −
directions of any of the two qubits, under the exchange of the state of the first qubit
with the second qubit and finally under the change of basis.
It is possible to divide the scalar products into 10 different groups (for details
see Appendix A), each group defining a free parameter. When imposing the sym-
metry and unitarity conditions the number of independent parameters is reduced
to only two real ones. (The 4-state protocol requires 5 real parameters [6]). These
two parameters can be chosen in several different ways, but a convenient one for the
problem under investigation is to chose α, β and γ, while keeping in mind the nor-
malization condition (19), and express the remaining parameters in terms of these
three.
This dramatic reduction in parameters has lead to the following conditions on the
states of Eve’s probe. First all scalar products between states of different kinds (e.g.
a ψ0 with a ψ11) vanishes. Consequently Eve can know whether Bob received both
qubits undisturbed, or both disturbed, or the first one disturbed but not the second
one, or vice versa. Next, all 4 ψ2-states are mutually orthogonal. Third, all ψ11-
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and ψ12-states with different indices for qubit received disturbed by Bob are also
orthogonal. Hence, as for incoherent eavesdropping, Eve can gain full information
on all qubits received disturbed by Bob. Finally, for the ψ11- and ψ12-states the only
scalar products different from zero are:
〈ψzz12 |ψ−zz12 〉 = 〈ψ−z−z12 |ψz−z12 〉 =
〈ψzz11 |ψz−z11 〉 = 〈ψ−z−z11 |ψ−zz11 〉 =
β − γ
β
(20)
and finally non of the ψ0-states are orthogonal.
Eve is now left in the following situation: After her eavesdropping attack, she
first has to distinguish between the four types of states her probe could be left in,
i.e. whether she remains with a ψ0, ψ11, ψ12 or a ψ2-state. Since these four types of
states are orthogonal Eve will after her first measurement know exactly which kind
of the four she posses. Suppose she finds that she remains with a ψ2-state, since
the states within this subset are all orthogonal Eve can again identify with certainty
which one of them she has.
For the ψ11 and ψ12-states she has to distinguish between states which are not all
orthogonal, but fulfill (20), these states can in an optimal way be chosen as follows:
ψzz11 = cos θ · e1 + sin θ · e3
ψz−z11 = cos θ · e2 + sin θ · e4
ψ−zz11 = sin θ · e1 + cos θ · e3
ψ−z−z11 = sin θ · e2 + cos θ · e4
(21)
where {ej} is an ortho-normal basis. Eve again uses a standard von Neumann mea-
surement with eigenstates ej to distinguish these states. If the outcome of her mea-
surement is the state e1 she interprets this as if the initial state was ψ
zz
11 , where as
if she finds the state e2 she interpret it as ψ
z−z
11 , etc. In this way her probability for
making the correct conclusion is P12 = cos
2θ, and probability P11 = sin
2θ for making
an error. (We use the notation Pij to denote Eve’s probability of guessing correctly
j qubit when i of the qubits arrive disturbed to Bob). Similarly for the ψ12-states.
For the ψ0-states the situation is more complicated since non of the states are
orthogonal. Let us again introduce an ortho-normal basis {ej} and expand the ψ0
states [22]:
ψzz0 = a · e1 + b · e2 + b · e3 + c · e4
ψz−z0 = b · e1 + a · e2 + c · e3 + b · e4
ψ−zz0 = b · e1 + c · e2 + a · e3 + b · e4
ψ−z−z0 = c · e1 + b · e2 + b · e3 + a · e4
(22)
where a, b, c satisfy the normalization a2+2b2+c2 = 1 and constrains imposed by the
scalar products among the ψ0’s, as described in appendix A. Defining (k, l, k
′, l′ =
±z):
1. Aj = α〈ψkl0 |ψk
′l′
0 〉=product among ψ0’s with j differences between the indices
kl and k’l’, j = 1, 2,
2. B1 = β〈ψkl1j |ψk
′l′
1j 〉=product among ψ1j ’s with one difference between the in-
dices kl and k’l’ corresponding to the undisturbed qubit (e.g. B1 = β〈ψkl11 |ψk−l11 〉 =
β〈ψkl12 |ψ−kl12 〉).
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we obtained:
A1 = α− β B1 = β − γ
A2 = α− 2β + γ (23)
while all other scalar product vanish. Notice that as in the incoherent eavesdropping
case, Eve gains full information on all qubits that arrive disturbed to Bob.
As before, Eve interprets the outcome e1 of her measurement as if the initial
state was ψzz0 , the outcome e2 as if the initial state was ψ
z−z
0 etc. Her probability of
making the right conclusion about the state is thus P02 = a
2, in this case she will
have both qubit sent by Alice correctly. With probability P01 = 2b
2 she will get the
state wrong with the following consequence: she will have one of the qubits sent by
Alice correct and the other wrong. There is of course two ways to obtain this; either
the first qubit is correct and the second wrong or the first qubit is wrong and the
second correct. Finally Eve will with probability P00 = c
2 get the state wrong, with
the consequence that she will draw the wrong conclusion about both qubits.
P12, P11, P02, P01 and P00, can all be expressed in terms of the three parameters
α, β and γ, see Appendix B.
It is now possible to compute Eve’s probability of guessing both of the two qubits
correctly, P c(G), her probability P c(G|undist.) of guessing one qubit correctly when
Bob received it undisturbed, as well as her Shannon Information, IcS and her Renyi
Informations, IcR, in terms of the found probabilities;
P c(G) = α · P02 + 2β · P12 + γ (24)
P c(G|undist.) = α(P02 +
1
2
P01) + βP11
α+ β
(25)
IcS = α · ScS(P02, 12P01, 12P01, P00) + 2β · ScS(P12, P11, 0, 0)
+ γ · ScS(1, 0, 0, 0)
(26)
where ScS(p1, p2, p3, p4) = 2 + p1log2p1 + p2log2p2 + p3log2p3 + p4log2p4.
IcR = α · ScR(P02, 12P01, 12P01, P00) + 2β · ScR(P12, P11, 0, 0)
+ γ · ScR(1, 0, 0, 0)
(27)
where ScR(p1, p2, p3, p4) = 2 + log2(p
2
1 + p
2
2 + p
2
3 + p
2
4).
A special case of 2-qubit attack is of course a double incoherent attack. It is
straightforward, though cumbersome, to check that this corresponds to α = F 2,
β = FD, γ = D2 and that all the above formula reduce then to the corresponding
ones in section 3, with all of Eve’s probe states factoring, e.g. ψi,j12 = ψ
i
0 ⊗ ψj1.
In order to understand what Eve can gain using coherent instead of incoherent
eavesdropping, we investigated numerically all four quantities P c(G), P c(G|undist.),
IcS and I
c
R searching each time for the optimal value of α for a given disturbance D
and compared this with the corresponding quantity obtained for the same distur-
bance with incoherent eavesdropping. Let us first consider P c(G), the probability
that Eve guesses the bits correctly. Figure 1 presents the results. The long curve
from D = 0 to D = 0.5 corresponds to the incoherent eavesdropping strategy, while
the 4 shorter curves correspond to different coherent eavesdropping strategies. For
each of the latter, the parameter α is fixed at the indicated value (7/8, 3/4, 1/2 and
1/4). Since α and the disturbance cannot vary independently over the entire range,
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the 4 curves are only plotted for possible values ofD around the value that maximizes
P c(G). Note that for 0 disturbance, Eve has a probability 0.25 of guessing correctly
both qubits. More important, this figure shows that coherent attacks can slightly
increase Eve’s fidelity P c(G). This can more clearly be seen on the inset which dis-
plays a zoom of the α = 7/8 case. This result differs from the other probability of
interest, namely Eve’s probability of rightly guessing a qubit received undisturbed by
Bob, P c(G|undist.). Indeed, numerical evidence show that P c(G|undist.) is maximal
precisely for α = F 2, that is precisely when the 2-qubit coherent attack reduce to
double incoherent attacks. Consequently, the use of coherent eavesdropping strate-
gies can increase Eve’s probability of guessing correctly 2 qubits. However, if one
restricts the probability to those qubits received undisturbed by Bob, then coherent
eavesdropping is of no use to Eve (at least for 2-qubit eavesdropping).
For Eve’s information, the situations are depicted on figure 2 (Shannon informa-
tion) and 3 (Renyi information). It turns out that Eve Shannon information is not
increased by coherent attacks, while her Renyi information is (slightly) increased. It
might seem strange that Eve’s fidelity increases without a corresponding increase in
her Shannon information, but this can be understood as indicating that the prob-
ability that Eve guesses correctly both qubits is compensated by a corresponding
increase of her probability to guess wrongly both qubits.
5 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping
The generalization to 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping is now straightforward. In
brief, the unitary interaction between the 3 qubits and Eve’s probe (generalizing
(17)) reads:
| k, k, k 〉 ⊗ | 0 〉 U−→ √α | k, k, k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk0
+
√
β (| k, k,−k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk13 + | k,−k, k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk12 + |−k, k, k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk11
+
√
γ(| k,−k,−k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk21 + |−k, k,−k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk22 + |−k,−k, k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk23
+
√
δ |−k,−k,−k 〉 ⊗ ψkkk3 (28)
where ψkkk0 denotes Eve’s probe state in case none of the qubits is disturbed, ψ
kkk
1j in
case the jth qubit and only this one is disturbed, ψkkk2j in case all qubits are disturbed
except the jth one, and ψkkk3 in case all 3 qubits are disturbed. The fidelity and
disturbance read: F = α+2β+γ and D = β+2γ+δ, with normalization F +D = 1.
As for the 2-qubit case, unitarity and symmetry imposes severe restrictions on the
scalar products. Using the following notations (k, l,m, k′, l′,m′ = ±z):
1. Aj = α〈ψklm0 |ψk
′l′m′
0 〉=product among ψ0’s with j differences between the
indices klm and k’l’m’, j = 1, 2, 3,
2. B1 = β〈ψklm1j |ψk
′l′m′
1j 〉=product among ψ1j ’s with one difference between the
indices klm and k’l’m’ corresponding to an undisturbed qubit (e.g. B1 =
β〈ψklm11 |ψkl−m11 〉),
3. B2 = β〈ψklm1j |ψk
′l′m′
1j 〉=product among ψ1j ’s with two differences between the
indices klm and k’l’m’ corresponding to the two undisturbed qubits (e.g. B2 =
β〈ψklm11 |ψk−l−m11 〉),
4. C1 = γ〈ψklm2j |ψk
′l′m′
2j 〉=product among ψ2j ’s with one difference between the in-
dices klm and k’l’m’ corresponding the undisturbed qubit(e.g. C1 = γ〈ψklm21 |ψ−klm21 〉),
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we obtained, see appendix C:
A1 = α− β B1 = β − γ
A2 = α− 2β + γ B2 = β − 2γ + δ
A3 = α− 3β + 3γ − δ C1 = γ − δ
(29)
while all other scalar product vanish. Notice that again Eve gains full information
on all qubits that arrive disturbed to Bob.
Once Eve knows which kind of states she has, an information she can reliably
get, as in the previous cases, she is left with the problem of optimally distinguishing
among the states of that kind. The corresponding probabilities are summarized in
appendix C. The main result is that using 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping does not
improve Eve’ Shannon information. Nor does it improve Eve’s probability of guessing
correctly a bit received undisturbed by Bob:
P c(G|undist.) = α(P03 + 2P02 + P01) + 2β(P13 + P12) + γP23
α+ 2β + γ
(30)
= P (G|undist.)3 (31)
where P (G|undist.) is given by relation (12).
However, it improves the probability that Eve guesses correctly all three qubits:
P c(G) = αP03 + 3βP13 + 3γP23 + δ (32)
> P (G)3 (33)
where P (G) is given by relation (11).
Contrary to the 2-qubit case, the gain is not neglectable: for a disturbance of 7%
the gain on Eve’s probability P c(G) of guessing all 3 qubits correctly is increased by
6%, with respect to incoherent eavesdropping. This contrasts with the 1.7% increase
shown in figure 1 for the 2-qubit case. Note however, that this larger gain is over a
lower probability P (G)3.
6 Error correction and privacy amplification
In this section we discuss the possibility that Eve keeps her probe until after Alice
and Bob have carried out the error correction and the privacy amplification phase
of the protocol, using the public channel. Eve can then measure her probe taking
into account all the information she got from the public channel, optimizing her
information on the final key. We shall consider only a simply error correction and
privacy amplification protocol. This protocol is far from optimal (most bits are
wasted), but showing that Alice and Bob are safe using this simple protocol, would
prove that quantum cryptography can be made secure even on noisy channels. The
protocol goes as follows. After Alice and Bob have recorded their raw key (qubits
send and received in the same basis), they randomly chose pairs of bits and compute
their xor sum. For error correction, they announce the xor value and keep the first
bit if and only if they agree on the xor value (the second bit is always discarded).
For privacy amplification, Alice and Bob do not announce the xor value, but discard
the 2 randomly chosen bits while keeping the xor sum for a new key with improved
privacy [23]. Hence, the problem for Eve is to measure her probe in such a way
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as to maximize her likelihood to correctly guess the xor sum of two given qubits
(in known bases). Clearly, Eve learns which qubits are paired only after her probe
has interacted with the qubits, hence the interaction between the qubits and the
probes can still be assumed symmetric and identical for all qubits, as described in
the previous section.
The problem of finding Eve’s optimal measurements is a very difficult one. In
this section we shall merely use the best measurement we have found. Due to the
symmetry of the problem we believe that these measurements are optimal, though we
recognize that this is an unproven assumption. Also, we shall assume that all qubits
received disturbed by Bob are removed during the error correction phase, hence we
shall only consider the qubits that Bob receives undisturbed.
Let us first consider the case of incoherent eavesdropping, that is Eve attaches
one probe per qubit. For this case the best measurement for Eve that we could
find consists simply in measuring each probe separately (this is more efficient, in
particular, than to measure whether the two probes are jointly in a singlet or triplet
state). Then, the probability that Eve guesses correctly the xor sum of the two bits
reads:
Pxor1 = P
2
s + (1− Ps)2 = 1−
1
2
(1− 2D)2
(1−D)2 (34)
where Ps is the probability that Eve guesses correctly any undisturbed bit, see (12),
and D is the disturbance. Figure 4 displays Pxor1 in function of the disturbance
(lower curve).
Next, we consider the case of 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping. In general the two
qubits attached to one probe will not be paired by Alice and Bob. However, for
the argument, let us assume that Eve would like to guess the xor value of the bits
corresponding to a single probe. The optimal measurement we found reads:
Pxor2 = P00 + P02 (35)
where P0j is the probability that Eve guesses correctly j of the two bits (assuming
both are undisturbed). Using the equations (46) of appendix B one obtains:
Pxor2 =
1
4α
(
3− α− 4D +√9α− 5 + 6D√α− 1 + 2D
)
(36)
For D ≥ 1
3
, Pxor2 reaches the maximal value of 1 for α =
1−D
2
. For D ∈ [5−
√
13
12
..1
3
],
the maximum is reached for α = 5−21D+28D
2−12D3
4−6D . Finally, for D ≤ 5−
√
13
12
the
maximum is reached for α = 1−D. Figure 4 displays the maximum values of Pxor2 in
function of the disturbance D (upper curve). This clearly shows that Eve gains using
2-qubit eavesdropping instead of incoherent eavesdropping (lower curve) (except for
D = 3−
√
3
6
). Accordingly, Eve gains using 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping, provided
she is lucky enough that Alice and Bob chose to pair the two qubits. However, such a
lucky coincidence is practically excluded if the total number of qubits is much larger
than two.
In order to increase the chance that Alice and Bob randomly chosen pairs of bits
are attached to the same probe, Eve should use n-qubit attacks with large n. Let
us consider the case n=3 (still not very large, but large enough that several pairing
are possible). For this case, we found that Eve’s optimal measurement provides her
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with the following probability of a correct guess of the xor value:
Pxor3 =
(
α(P03 +
1
3
P02 +
1
3
P01 + P00) + β(P13 + P11)
)
1
α+ β
(37)
where the explicit form of the Pij are given in appendix C eqs. (47) - (50). Numerical
optimization of Pxor3 is shown on figure 4 (middle curve). It shows that while Eve
gains more information using a 3-qubit coherent strategy than an incoherent one,
she gains less than using a 2-qubit strategy. Based on this result, we conjecture that
Eve gains less using an n-qubit strategy than using a m-qubit one, with m < n.
However, this should be balanced against the fact that the probability that Alice
and Bob chose pairs of bit corresponding to the same probe increases with n.
The argument concludes now as follows. Assume Eve uses n-qubit coherent eaves-
dropping. If, on the one side, n is too small, then the probability that the pairs of
bits used for error correction and privacy amplification correspond to the same probe
is small. In this case Eve does not gain delaying her measurement until after privacy
amplification. On the other side, if n is too large, then Eve’s information gain is neg-
ligibly larger than if she would use incoherent eavesdropping. Finally, for incoherent
attacks, Eve does not gain anything by delaying her measurement until the privacy
amplification phase of the protocol. Hence, under the plausible assumptions that
the measurements used in this section are indeed optimal, we conclude that Eve’s
optimal strategy consists in attaching one probe per qubit (i.e. incoherent eavesdrop-
ping) and to measure her probe as soon as she learns the basis. The only additional
information she can then get is during the error correction public discussion (a purely
classical problem) for which bounds are known.
7 Concluding remarks
Coherent eavesdropping strategies are unpractical with today’s technology. However,
it is important for the reliability of quantum cryptography to clarify the question
of whether such strategies could in the future affect its security. Assuming that
the results presented in this article for 2- and 3-qubit coherent strategies can be
generalized to arbitrary n-qubit strategies, one should be optimistic for quantum
cryptography. Indeed, neither the Shannon information, nor Eve’s probability of
guessing correctly a bit received undisturbed by Bob [24] can be increased using
coherent attacks. Admittedly, a complete analysis of eavesdropping strategies should
incorporate the possibility that Eve keeps her probes until Alice and Bob have carried
out all the public discussion part of the protocol, including the privacy amplification
protocol. Such an analysis is sketched in section 6 where we present arguments based
on the classification of eavesdropping strategies presented in the previous sections
concluding that Eve could only gain a negligible small addition information which
would not affect the security of the entire protocol.
The connection to optimal quantum cloning machines, described in section 3.1,
generalizes to the 6-state protocol the connection to the Bell inequality found for the
4-state protocol [19, 5, 6]. Possible connections between coherent eavesdropping and
quantum cloning of higher dimension systems remains an open problem. There is an
interesting connection between, on the one hand side, the fact that optimal quantum
cloning machine never produce more errors than the number of additional copies [8],
and, on the other side, that in optimal eavesdropping Eve gains full information on
12
all qubits that arrive disturbed to Bob: for all disturbed qubits, Eve knows that her
copy is perfect (if not, there would be more errors than additional copies).
Using the highly symmetric 6-state protocol introduced in section 2, one can pa-
rameterize all incoherent eavesdropping strategies by a single real parameter and all
2-qubit coherent strategies with 2 real parameters and all 3-qubit strategies with 3
real parameters. Hence, all these cases can be analyzed in details. Our results show
that using coherent attacks, Eve can improve on some tasks, like for example increas-
ing her probability of guessing both qubits correctly, but that she can’t gain for some
other tasks, like for example guessing correctly a qubit received undisturbed by Bob.
In addition to its relevance for the study of the security of quantum cryptography
over noisy channels, this result illustrates that some tasks can be improved by using
quantum coherence, while some other tasks cannot.
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A 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping: Constrains on Eve’s
probes and reduction of parameters
Eve applies a symmetric eavesdropping strategy [9]. This imposes some constrains
on the scalar products. Namely, that the scalar products have to be invariant under
the exchange of + and − directions of any of the two qubits, under the exchange
of the state of the first qubit with the second qubit and finally under the change of
basis. Define the following parameters:
A1 = α 〈ψzz0 |ψz−z0 〉 = α 〈ψzz0 |ψ−zz0 〉
= α 〈ψ−z−z0 |ψz−z0 〉 = α 〈ψ−z−z0 |ψ−zz0 〉
A2 = α 〈ψzz0 |ψ−z−z0 〉 = α 〈ψz−z0 |ψ−zz0 〉
B1 = β 〈ψzz12 |ψ−zz12 〉 = β 〈ψz−z12 |ψ−z−z12 〉
= β 〈ψzz11 |ψz−z11 〉 = β 〈ψ−zz11 |ψ−z−z11 〉
B2 = β 〈ψzz12 |ψz−z12 〉 = β 〈ψ−zz12 |ψ−z−z12 〉
= β 〈ψzz11 |ψ−zz11 〉 = β 〈ψz−z11 |ψ−z−z11 〉
B3 = β 〈ψzz12 |ψ−z−z12 〉 = β 〈ψ−zz12 |ψz−z12 〉
= β 〈ψzz11 |ψ−z−z11 〉 = β 〈ψz−z11 |ψ−zz11 〉
C1 = γ 〈ψzz2 |ψz−z2 〉 = γ 〈ψzz2 |ψ−zz2 〉
= γ 〈ψz−z2 |ψ−z−z2 〉 = γ 〈ψ−zz2 |ψ−z−z2 〉
C2 = γ 〈ψzz2 |ψ−z−z2 〉 = γ 〈ψz−z2 |ψ−zz2 〉
(38)
Note that Aj involved the scalar product between two ψ0-states (i.e. states corre-
sponding to both of Bob’s qubits undisturbed) with j different indices, j = 1, 2. B1,
B2 and B3 involve states corresponding to one of Bob’s qubit disturbed (i.e. ψ11- or
ψ12-states) with the same index for the undisturbed qubit, the same index for the
disturbed qubit and different indices for both qubit, respectively. Finally, the Cj ,
j = 1, 2 involve states corresponding to both qubits disturbed (i.e. ψ2-states) with j
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different indices. The symmetry under exchange of the directions and states of the
two qubits together with the unitarity condition gives that the parameters have to
fulfill the following relations:
α− β = A1 +B2 β − γ = B1 + C1
B2 −B3 = C1 +C2 A1 −A2 = B3 +B1 (39)
In this way the number of parameters have been reduced from 10 down to 5 real
parameters. By imposing the invariance under change of basis, the number of pa-
rameters is further reduced to only two independent. They can, of course, be chosen
in many different ways, but a convenient one is choosing α, β and γ and express
all other parameters in terms of these three, while remembering the normalization
condition (19):
A1 = α− β A2 = α− 2β + γ
B1 = β − γ B2 = 0 B3 = 0
C1 = 0 C2 = 0
(40)
Note that all scalar products between probe-states corresponding to qubits received
disturbed by Bob vanish. Hence, Eve can gain full information on these qubits.
B 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping: determinations of
the Pij probabilities
Using the overlaps between the various states (given in appendix A) together with the
expressions of the ψ11- and ψ12-states, see equation (21), one finds that 2 sin θ cos θ =
B1/β, hence
P12 = cos
2 θ
=
1
4
(
√
1 + (B1/β) +
√
1− (B1/β))2
=
1 +
√
2γ/β − γ2/β2
2
(41)
For the ψ0-states, let us introduce the vectors ~ψ ≡ (ψzz0 , ψz−z0 , ψ−zz0 , ψ−z−z0 ) and
~e ≡ (e1, e2, e3, e4) whose entries are elements of Eve’s probe Hilbert space. The ej
are the eigenstates of Eve’s measurement, hence they are mutually orthogonal [22].
The entries of the matrix X ≡ |~e 〉〈 ~ψ | are the probability amplitudes for the various
possible outcomes. The matrix X can be easily computed from:
X†X = | ~ψ 〉〈 ~ψ | = 1
α


α A1 A1 A2
A1 α A2 A1
A1 A2 α A1
A2 A1 A1 α

 (42)
Hence, one obtains the probabilities that define relation (22):
a ≡ 〈 e1 |ψz,z 〉 = 1
4

2
√
1− A2
α
+
√
1 +
A2
α
+ 2
A1
α
+
√
1 +
A2
α
− 2A1
α

 (43)
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b ≡ 〈 e2 |ψz,z 〉 = 1
4


√
1 +
A2
α
+ 2
A1
α
−
√
1 +
A2
α
− 2A1
α

 (44)
c ≡ 〈 e4 |ψz,z 〉 = 1
4

2
√
1− A2
α
−
√
1 +
A2
α
+ 2
A1
α
−
√
1 +
A2
α
− 2A1
α

 (45)
Finally, the probabilities P0j that Eve guesses correctly j bits are
P02 = a
2 P01 = 2b
2 and P00 = c
2. (46)
C 3-qubit eavesdropping: probability for Eve’s guesses
If Eve is left with a ψklm3 state, then she can know all three qubits (recall that all
the 8 ψklm3 states are mutually orthogonal).
If Eve is left with a ψklm2j state, then, using the same technique as in appendix B,
one finds that she has probability P23 =
1
2
(1 +
√
1− C21/γ2) to guess correctly all 3
qubits and P22 = 1− P23 to make one error.
If Eve is left with a ψklm1j state, then, using the same technique as in appendix
B, one finds that she has probability P1j to guess correctly j qubits, with j=1,2,3.
The formula are the same as for 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping, see (43) to (45),
but with the An and α replaced by Bn and β, respectively: P13 = a
2, P12 = 2b
2 and
p11 = c
2.
If Eve is left with a ψklm0 state, then, using again the technique of appendix B,
one finds that she has:
Probability to guess correctly all 3 qubits=
P03 =
1
64α
(
√
α+A3 + 3(A1 +A2) + 3
√
α−A3 +A1 −A2
+
√
α−A3 − 3(A1 −A2) + 3
√
α+A3 −A1 −A2 )2, (47)
Probability to guess correctly 2 of the 3 qubits=
P02 =
3
64α
(
√
α+A3 + 3(A1 +A2) +
√
α−A3 +A1 −A2
−
√
α−A3 − 3(A1 −A2)−
√
α+A3 −A1 −A2 )2, (48)
Probability to guess correctly 1 of the 3 qubits=
P01 =
3
64α
(
√
α+A3 + 3(A1 +A2)−
√
α−A3 +A1 −A2
+
√
α−A3 − 3(A1 −A2)−
√
α+A3 −A1 −A2 )2, (49)
Probability to guess correctly none of the 3 qubits=
P00 =
1
64α
(
√
α+A3 + 3(A1 +A2)− 3
√
α−A3 +A1 −A2
−
√
α−A3 − 3(A1 −A2) + 3
√
α+A3 −A1 −A2 )2. (50)
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Figure Captions
1. Probability that Eve guesses correctly two bits out of two in function of the
disturbance D. The long curve from D = 0 to D = 0.5 corresponds to the
incoherent eavesdropping strategy of section 3, while the 4 shorter curves corre-
spond to different 2-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies described in section
4. For each of the latter, the parameter α is fixed at the indicated value (7/8,
3/4, 1/2 and 1/4). This figure shows that coherent attacks can slightly increase
Eve’s fidelity P c(G). This can more clearly be seen on the inset which displays
a zoom of the α = 7/8 case.
2. Same as figure 1, but for Eve’s Shannon information. Coherent eavesdropping
does not improve Eve’s Shannon information.
3. Same as figure 1, but for Eve’s Renyi information. Coherent eavesdropping does
slightly improve Eve’s Renyi information.
4. Probability that Eve guesses correctly the xor sum of two bits. The lower
curve corresponds to incoherent eavesdropping. The upper and middle curves
corresponds to 2-qubit and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping assuming the two
bits correspond to qubits attached to the same probe.
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